
Connections UK – September 2023 Wargaming the lessons from Current Operations





What Current Operations?



Ukraine – are we *learning* lessons, jumping to conclusions, or what?




Army 2026 and the new Land Operating Concept – what are current operations telling us about future operations, and how are we testing that?



Is the 'transparent battlefield' as big a problem for wargamers as it is for the modern military?

My question for you, throughout, is what can you professional wargamers do, in all of these spaces, to help?



1. UKRAINE



How's the 'Counter-offensive' going?



Against Who's Expectations?



How Much Op-Level Research Are We Doing?



AND WHO IS DOING IT?













What's the 'Reasonable Benchmark'?



The Big Paradox



Trying Out Some Alternatives



Negotiate?

Strategic isolation?

Simultaneous problems across Op and Strat width and depth?

How to use attrition? On what?

How to recognise 'tipping points'.

'Playing Kaliningrad'?

Trojan horses?


Armies need Air Forces



Armies need Air Forces And Air Defence!



Attrition vs Manoeuverism: The Big Question To Re-open?





WHY REPELLING RUSSIA REQUIRES AN ASYMMETRIC APPROACH



Brigadier Gerhard Wheeler Is an adviser to the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. During his previous service as a regular British Army officer he held a number of operational command appointments, including command of a multilinational force in Afghanistan and a battlegroup

History showed that there could be no single theory of strategy, correct for every age." Gordon Craig, Makers of Modern History

#HAT form of worfore should the British Army plan to fight to deter Russian aggression to taken Europe Whan it least faced a similar question in the latter stopps of the Cold War, a plumped for the concept of moneouve worfore. Bod decision to the visual part of the concept of moneouve worfore. Bod decision to development of its dectrine, capabilities and the development of its dectrine, capabilities and force design. But a moneouver wordors the answer for the challenges it focus today? It converted that question, it is worth compare the theory olongaids its sister concepts at matrician and positional worfore.

Albough anguably a centries-old lides, the theory of manosone warfare enjoyed a renaissance in the 1980s. Food with find throat of a Soviet Array fleet could mobile million of ten in an amound assault on Western Europe, US and UK million y tentegrish looked for a plan find could provide an effective and for a plan find could provide an effective and cardials from of conventional determence to overt an afmost immediate and inevibable with the nuclear weapons. Contraining by West Germany's policy of Torward Defence, which demonded that on yn tillary follows.

possible, they chose a scheme that made the most of the advantages of their smaller but more technologically-advanced and professional land and air forces. The US led the charge with its AirLand Battle concept,1 which was partly a rejection of its failed attritional campaign in Vietnam. The British Army took a similar approach under the leadership of Field Marshal Sir Nigel Bagnall. Bagnall's proposa mirrored the US AirLand Battle concept by advocating the need for a manaeuvre-oriented approach to military operations, focusing on agility, tempo and shock directed against the apparent's weak points rather than an setpiece, attritional and territory-oriented battles. In both cases, a different relationship with the air forces was an inherent part of the concept and key to its success.

There are numerous competing definitions of manaeuvre warfare but in its simplest form it can be described as the use, or threat, of force to break the cohesion of an enemy. In

Gesset, Robert A, The AirLand battle and NATO's new distribula debate, The RUSI Journal, Volume 129, 1984 — Lesse 2.

⁴Made, Markus, In pursuit of Conceptual Excellence: The Evolution of British Military-Strategic Ductrine in the Post Cold Wire Era, 1989-2002, 2004, p89.

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2. A NEW WAY OF WINNING



THE LAND OPERATING CONCEPT - A NEW WAY OF WINNING

Major General James Bowder is Director Army

British Army Review, the Chief of the Commander Field Army underlined the importance of being ready to fight tonight. In and win wars tomorrow. This requires a conceptually driven, threat awars epproach to force development. One that starts by defining a way of winning fit for the 21st century, and that slaves its future copability and force structural judgments to bringing Concept - A New Way of Winning and

only increases the consistency and coherence of army force development through time, but also improves the quality of the capability and resource conversation with the broadle oreance community, octors government and internationally. As such, a land operating concept is akin to source code: a vital building block that drives everything else.

first, and foundational, deliverable of Project Wavell, the Army's exercise to refine its gimin mark and drive change into the 2030s. The concept builds on Future Soldier and Field Army's How We Fight 2026. Moreover It alians with Defence's Future Operation Concept and is driven both by NATO's strategic concept for the deterrence and

evidence base and has been rigorously tester We, in Army Futures, are extremely grateful for the energetic engagement of the Field Army, the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory, broader defence, academia, industry and overseas portners in the better as a result." Turning to the b of the new opproach esp Operating Concept, I will fire we see the future of explaining how we will gain

THE CHALLENGE

Competing states will present and unconventional military t and her interests during the n parallel, instability driven by climate change, evolving de the malign activity of hostile the British Army offering valu

home due to the growing phy reach of state competitors, an challenge presented by violer extreme weather and pane

Climate change and the part will shape the land force, pro apportunities and challenge Furthermore, so-called 'blac'

Future land bottle will be ch continuity and change. First,

PUTTING WARGAMING AT THE **HEART OF FORCE DESIGN** body of knowledge, evidence and analysis.

Head Strategy and Force Design in His previous appointments include Capability Planning in the Finance and Directorate and command of an



As we discuss in this edition of The British Army Review, our response to the conundrum has Analyst and has been to take an inductive approach to force more than 30 years development through Project Wavell. The British Army and others have amassed a huge operational research studies in support of Defence Force

refusing to search continually for learning is not." - Philip B. Crosbie

REDICTING the future has a history - a history waven with both remarkable insights and profound failures, and one that makes force development a wicked problem. Without certainty over any potential turns in the road ahead, what should the Army be designed to do and how should it do it? In the face of shifting policies and priorities, how do we generate the confidence necessary to make force design interventions?

a vision for how land power delivers relevan political choice in the future. Whilst this is in itself necessary. It is not sufficient. Once you have a theory, you must test the implications. When you employ a force, will it perform as you think? How will it respond to different advenary choices? How do you best balance the inevitable trade-offs in force design? What should you spend your money on to achieve the greatest impact?

We have used this as the basis for developing

wargaming at the heart of force development and used an analytical compains to deliver as iterative approach to concept and capability development. It will outline what we mean by wargaming and how we employ analytically robust techniques to develop insights into the future. These techniques underpinned Army Wargame 23, the largest force development wargame run by the Service in living memory. Coming at the end of a two-year campaign of analysis, this capstone, 11-week even

employed more than 250 analysts and players, from multiple providers, to explore the capability implications of the Land Operating Concept. Same of the conclusions will be familiar some will be a surprise. All offer insights that can shape future force design on the basis of evidence rather than simply staring into the crystal ball and hoping for the best.

"It is a copital mistake to theorise Sharlock Holmes

Wargaming is experimentation. Whilst lots of valuable experimentation takes place in the field, it is very difficult to generate a controlled and representative environment against which we can test and refine new ideas. Analytical wargaming is rinning or losing, it is not a simulation, and is not a means

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ON THE BRITISH ARMY PEVEW

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Snow Globes, 'Forming Square', 'defeat in detail', and Logistics










Dispersion, the Transparent Battlespace, and Drones?





3. THE TRANSPARENT BATTLESPACE, GHOST ARMIES AND DECEPTION











3. THE TRANSPARENT BATTLESPACE, GHOST ARMIES AND DECEPTION



Closing Thought



Who Is Your Champion?



Questions and Discussion...

