



Connections UK – September 2023

Wargaming the lessons from Current Operations



Maj Gen Dr Andrew Sharpe

What Current Operations?



Ukraine – are we *learning* lessons, jumping to conclusions, or what?



Army 2026 and the new Land Operating Concept – what are current operations telling us about future operations, and how are we testing that?



Is the ‘transparent battlefield’ as big a problem for wargamers as it is for the modern military?

1. UKRAINE




How's the 'Counter-offensive' going?

UKRAINE COUNTER OFFENSIVE FAILING?



Assessed Control of Terrain Around Pyatykhatky and Robotyne as of July 27, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



Ukraine counter-offensive on brink of 'major breakthrough'



Can Ukraine's counter-offensive succeed?




UKRAINIAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE
KIIV FORCES ADVANCE ON SOUTHERN FRONT AFTER FREED ROBOTYNE



The World This Week Ukraine Counter-Offensive



Against Who's Expectations?



How Much Op-Level Research Are We Doing?




AND WHO IS DOING IT?



What's the 'Reasonable Benchmark'?

ORGANISATION DÉFENSIVE SCHÉMATIQUE DES FORCES ARMÉES RUSSES EN UKRAINE


Souvorikine's wave breaker concept



The Big Paradox



Trying Out Some Alternatives



Negotiate?

Strategic isolation?

Simultaneous problems across Op and Strat width and depth?

How to use attrition? On what?

How to recognise 'tipping points'.

'Playing Kaliningrad'?

Trojan horses?

Armies need Air Forces



Armies need Air Forces And Air Defence!



Attrition vs Manoeuvrism: The Big Question To Re-open?



WHY REPELLING RUSSIA REQUIRES AN ASYMMETRIC APPROACH



AUTHOR
Brigadier Gerhard Wheeler is an adviser to the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. During his previous service as a regular British Army officer he held a number of operational command appointments, including command of a multinational force in Afghanistan and a battlegroup in Iraq.

WHAT form of warfare should the British Army plan to fight to deter Russian aggression in Eastern Europe? When it last faced a similar question in the latter stages of the Cold War, it plumped for the concept of manoeuvre warfare. That decision led to a revolution in how it thought about the development of its doctrine, capabilities and force design. But is manoeuvre warfare the answer for the challenges it faces today? To answer that question, it is worth comparing the theory alongside its sister concepts of attritional and positional warfare.

Although arguably a centuries-old idea, the theory of manoeuvre warfare enjoyed a renaissance in the 1980s. Faced with the threat of a Soviet Army that could mobilise millions of men in an armoured assault on Western Europe, US and UK military strategists looked for a plan that could provide an effective and credible form of conventional deterrence to avert an almost immediate and inevitable switch to nuclear weapons. Constrained by West Germany's policy of Forward Defence, which demanded that any military

engagements be fought as far eastwards as possible, they chose a scheme that made the most of the advantages of their smaller but more technologically-advanced and professional land and air forces. The US led the charge with its AirLand Battle concept,¹ which was partly a rejection of its failed attritional campaign in Vietnam. The British Army took a similar approach under the leadership of Field Marshal Sir Nigel Bagnall. Bagnall's proposals mirrored the US AirLand Battle concept by advocating the need for a manoeuvre-oriented approach to military operations, focusing on agility, tempo and shock directed against the opponent's weak points rather than on set-piece, attritional and territory-oriented battles.² In both cases, a different relationship with the air forces was an inherent part of the concept and key to its success.

There are numerous competing definitions of manoeuvre warfare but in its simplest form it can be described as the use, or threat, of force to break the cohesion of an enemy. In


¹ Gussner, Robert A. *The AirLand Battle and NATO's new doctrinal debate*, *The RUSI Journal*, Volume 129, 1984

² Madsen, Martin. *In pursuit of Conceptual Excellence: The Evolution of British Military Strategic Doctrine in the Post-Cold War Era*, 1989-2002, 2002, p.89.


Army Field Manual - Warfighting Tactics
Part 1: The Fundamentals
AC 72071





Snow Globes, 'Forming Square', 'defeat in detail', and Logistics




Dispersion, the Transparent Battlespace, and Drones?






3. THE TRANSPARENT BATTLESPACE, GHOST ARMIES AND DECEPTION




Is 'dispersion' the only answer to your problems?



3. THE TRANSPARENT BATTLESPACE, GHOST ARMIES AND DECEPTION



Is 'dispersion' the only answer to your problems?



Closing Thought



Who Is Your Champion?



Questions and Discussion...

